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Formal Modelling of Railway Safety and 
Capacity 
Alexei Iliasov and Alexander Romanovsky 
CSR, Newcastle University 
Abstract Development of future railway systems requires a rigorous modelling of 
safety and capacity conducted in an integrated way. Supported by EPSRC and 
Rail Safety and Standards Board the SafeCap project laid the foundations for 
overcoming challenges to railway capacity without undermining rail network 
safety. The main outcome of the project is the SafeCap Toolset, which relies on a 
formal Domain Specific Language, safety verification and capacity simulation 
methodologies. The work was conducted in close cooperation with Siemens Rail 
Automation and evaluated using the layouts of a number of UK stations. The 
Toolset is being further actively developed and evaluated in a series of industrial 
and impact acceleration projects. 
1 Introduction 
The Rail Technical Strategy 2012 produced by the UK Technical Strategy Leader-
ship Group (TSLG) sets out a number of challenging objectives to be achieved by 
the UK railway industry in the coming 40 years (TSLG 2012). As part of this 
work a series of the SafeCap projects have been funded to develop theories, meth-
ods and tools that address the challenges of improving railway capacity at the 
same time providing strong guarantees of system safety. The approach taken by 
the project is motivated by the needs to deal with the railway systems/networks of 
growing complexity, to reduce their development time, and to increase the confi-
dence in the products developed. 
One of the main decisions we made in this work was to use formal methods to 
model systems, stations, layouts and control tables, and to formally verify their 
consistency and safety. Even though the railway industry is the main success story 
in accepting formal methods, their application is still patchy. One of the barriers is 
the high cost of training and deployment. To address this issue we developed a 
graphical Domain Specific Language that has formal semantics and allows us to 
fully hide formal methods and tools. This is complemented by a high performance 
automated verification back-end capable of verifying large stations automatically. 
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The capacity is evaluated by simulation of the formal models and the results are 
shown in terms of the Domain Specific Language. 
In this work we are relying on the extensive experience we gained in the FP7 
DEPLOY Integrated Project on developing the Rodin toolset supporting the 
Event-B method and in deploying it in Bosch, SAP, Siemens Transportation Sys-
tems, and other companies (Romanovsky and Thomas 2013). This experience has 
helped us to develop an extensible SafeCap Eclipse-based environment supporting 
the work of railway signalling engineers in designing stations/junctions that are 
safe and have the improved capacity. 
2 Problems and objectives  
Let us discuss the principal problems and objectives of railway signalling verifica-
tion. Within the hierarchy defined in (Fokkink and Hollingshead 1998) we focus 
exclusively on the middle interlocking layer leaving out details of the lower layer 
of physical equipment functioning and the upper layer of railway logics and ex-
ploitation largely out of the view. We identify five kinds of railway safety verifi-
cation concerns. The first three are the fundamental safety properties that may be 
reasoned about at a specification level abstracting away from minute details of 
physical track topology and the setting in which the track is laid. The remaining 
two require consideration of concrete track geometry, topography, train exploita-
tion characteristics and prospective service requirements. 
A schema must be free from collisions. A collision happens when two trains oc-
cupy the same part of a track. Reasoning about collisions must take into an ac-
count concrete topology, requires an explicit train notion, the definition of laws of 
train movement and assumptions about train driver (either human or automatic) 
behaviour. Note that if train drivers choose to ignore whatever means of indication 
of track occupation states are available to them (e.g., track side signals) there is 
nothing preventing two trains from colliding. Hence, the absence of collisions is 
ensured by demonstrating the compatibility of specific topology, signalling and 
certain driving rules.  
The basic safety mechanism is that of route locking and holding (see Figure 1 
below). A train is given permission to enter an area of a railway once there is a 
continuous and safe path through this area assigned exclusively to this train. Such 
a path is normally called a route and is delineated by signals - either physical 
trackside signals with lamps or conceptual signals displayed to a driver via a com-
puter screen. Two-aspect signals (red/green or stop/proceed) are positioned at the 
maximum braking distance from each other and this defines the smallest train sep-
aration. 3- and 4- and higher aspect signalling allows trains to come closer by ad-
vising drivers on the safe speed and the extent of free track available in front. 
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Fig.1. A part of mid-size junction topology and an excerpt from its control table. Route S21_S22 consists of three train detection 
circuits: BH, XA and BB1. A train detection circuit is a part of a railway (a sub-graph in an abstract topology) with some equipment 
capable of reporting the presence or absence of a train in this part. To avoid derailment, the movement of point P100 requires that 
circuit XA is clear. This, in its turn, requires that routes S53_S22 and S21_S22 are not set. To control speed on a curved track, the 
layout uses fixed speed limits (circles with numbers) and approach speed control. One example of the latter is a control table mandat-
ing that a train travelling over the route S71_S23 occupies BR3 for at least 15 seconds. 
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When a route is locked, all the movable equipment such as points or level 
crossings must be set and detected in a position that would let a train safely travel 
on its desired route. They must remain locked in such a state until the train pas-
sage is positively confirmed. 
A schema must be free from derailments. A derailment may happen when a 
train moves over a point that is not set in any specific direction and thus may 
move under a train. To avoid this, a point must be positively confirmed to be 
locked before a train may travel over it. In a control table one writes a condition 
defining when a point reconfiguration may happen. 
Another reason for derailment is driving a train through a curve at an unsafe 
speed. As a train goes over a curve, the combination of gravitational, centripetal 
and centrifugal forces exerts a rolling force on train carriages and a substantial 
lateral force on rails. This effect can be mitigated by track canting although no 
single canting is a perfect fit for all train types. Hence, enforcing a safe speed limit 
before a train enters a curved track area is an essential safety consideration. There 
are several ways of doing this. One is a static speed limit. This can be a signboard 
warning a driver or an electronic signal sent to an on-board computer. A speed 
restriction may be also enforced by signalling: a signal does not switch into a 
permissive aspect until a train is detected to occupy some preceding detection cir-
cuit for a duration time. A combination of such time duration and track length 
gives an upper train speed limit. 
Physical layout properties. A range of properties pertinent to safety requires 
analysis of land topography over which track is build. As one example, it must be 
ensured that physical signals have certain minimum sighting distance giving a 
sufficient time for a driver to react. Sometimes tracks are so close together that 
carriages of a train going through a curve may come into a contact with carriages 
of a train located on a parallel track. A signalling engineer must identify and pro-
tect such areas (known as fouling points) via signalling rules. Further examples 
include gradients at stopping points (e.g., signals) that may be unsafe for heavy 
trains, parts of track susceptible to landslips, debris on the track due to nearby 
trees and overpasses, and so on. An important consideration is the spacing be-
tween signals and speed restriction signs: it must be possible for all trains to brake 
within the given limits to meet signal or speed limit restriction. Signal positioning 
and speed restriction would be wastefully conservative if one does not consider 
specific properties of traffic, in particular train acceleration and braking perfor-
mance.  
Quality of service. It is never sufficient to consider the safety aspect of a rail-
way in isolation from its performance. Indeed, setting all signals permanently to 
red (stop) state trivially satisfies all the safety concerns discussed above. As a less 
extreme example, there could be a signalling mistake preventing or hindering train 
progress but not violating safety properties. Typically, when signalling a station or 
a junction, an engineer would have access to a provisional timetable. A timetable 
defines traffic class and station calling and dwelling times. It must be ensured that 
signalling is able to accommodate such traffic with some extra margin for unac-
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counted or delayed traffic. Simulation of train runs is the common way to check 
quality of service requirements. 
3 Safety verification  
Figure 3 depicts the interaction between a signaling engineer and a verification 
tool. There is a conceptual barrier between a railway model that an engineer inter-
acts with and the model handled by formal verification tools. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Formal verification in railway domain: principal actors and flow 
 
Let us now look into the main approaches to signalling verification approaches 
used in the industry and proposed by academia. In practice, several techniques are 
often combined to complement each other's strengths.  
Manual review. Just as compilation of control tables is often a manual process, 
verification may also be accomplished via a carefully set up but otherwise manual 
review procedure. In most cases, to facilitate legibility, control tables are written 
in a highly structured tabular form following a common standard, i.e., UK Rail-
way Group Standard GK/RT 0202 (RGSOnline 2014) although historic and re-
gional peculiarities are not uncommon. One possible arrangement is having one 
company to design signalling and a competing company to verify it. The reason-
ing is that this way both parties are incentivized to do their best.  
Manual review is a slow process with very high requirements to reviewers' ex-
pertise. It does not deliver any objective proof of safety. At the same time, it does 
not suffer from any limitations of a formal verification process. 
Simulation. Railway industry widely employs railway simulation tools. These 
range from coarse-grained simulation of a national railway network to a detailed 
simulation of various aspects of mechanical performance of specific engines and 
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carriages in a combination with specific rail and ballast types. Verification con-
cerns span from analysis of digital communication protocols connecting trains and 
regional control to stressing of tunnels and bridges by passing trains.  
Simulation is widely applied for timetable optimisation and interactive 3D 
simulation is sometimes used for driver training. 
RailSys (RailSys 2014) and OpenTrack (OpenTrack 2014) are two of the well-
known simulation suites applied in timetable optimisation and general analysis of 
signalling performance. 
The main attraction of simulation is that it does not require deep understanding 
of railway functioning. Simulation tools present many aspects of railway perfor-
mance in an intuitive, visual manner helping to quickly obtain the big picture of 
overall layout and signalling performance. There is, however, no guarantee of 
safety as simulation can only ever consider a tiny proportion of all scenarios.  
Model checking. The safety challenge of railways and the fact that collision 
and derailment properties may be dealt with within the setting of discrete, inertia-
less train movement makes railway safety verification especially appealing for 
formal method practitioners. The principal idea of railway model checking is quite 
simple: a model of train movement laws is combined with the definitions of track 
topology and signalling rules. A model-checking tool attempts to go through all or 
many execution scenarios to confirm that unsafe scenarios are ruled out. The list 
of modelling notations used in this setting is practically endless. Notable examples 
include Coloured Petri nets (Janczura 1998), process algebra CSP (Winter 2002), 
a continuation work based on the model-based notation ASM (Winter and Robin-
son 2003), an algebraic language Maude (Hagalisletto et al. 2007) and the B 
Method together with ProB model checking tool (Leuschel and Butler 2003). 
Almost all model-checking approaches allow automatic instantiation of tem-
plate models making application of model checking relatively straightforward for 
engineers. Many tools are able to report a sequence of steps leading to a safety 
violation. While model checkers are able to analyse many more scenarios than a 
simulator this comes at a price of reduced expressiveness (i.e., inability to reason 
about track geometry) and proof certificate is generally not ultimate: there could 
be a false negative (i.e., the absence of an error report in case an error is present 
but not discovered) when a model is too large to analyse exhaustively. 
Theorem proving. Model checking imposes limitations on the model size and 
performs best with a relatively limited logical language. Theorem proving over-
comes these limitations and offers potentially unlimited opportunities for verifying 
safety with the utmost level of rigour. Theorem proving is not necessarily an all-
manual process: there is a large and successful community developing automated 
theorem provers (TPTP 2014). At the moment, automated prover support is best in 
the domain of first order logic and set theory; an attempt at reasoning about con-
tinuous train dynamics is likely to require an intervention by a highly skilled veri-
fication expert - the kind of people mostly found in academia. From our experi-
ence, even reasoning about track geometry is surprisingly difficult as this is a 
problem outside of the typical application domain of verification tools. One suc-
cess story with theorem proving is the on-going application of B method in the 
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railway domain (Essame and Dolle 2007). J.-R. Abrial has published methodolog-
ical guidelines on an economical use of basic logic and set theory to reason about 
railway safety in a discrete setting (Abrial 2006).  
Theorem proving, even with excellent tool support, requires a high level of ex-
pertise in formal verification and mathematical modelling. The semantic gap be-
tween logic and railway concepts is formidable. This leads to generally low 
productivity (but we should notice efforts like the BART tool for automatic re-
finement of B models (Burdy 1999), difficulties in interpreting tool feedback, and 
posing verification statements in a manner convincing to a non-expert reviewer. 
4 Safety verification in SafeCap 
The purpose of the SafeCap Toolset is to enable railway engineers to analyse 
complex junctions by experimenting with signalling rules, signalling principles, 
track topology, safety limits (e.g., speed limits for points and crossings) while 
receiving an on-line feedback from automated verification and analysis tools. 
We have built the Toolset around Eclipse - a mature and extensible IDE 
framework. We used Eclipse Modelling framework (EMF) to realise our Domain 
Specific Language (Iliasov and Romanovsky 2012). One important consideration 
was the ability to benefit from the extensive EMF ecosystem which offers a tool-
kit for model manipulation and the construction of graphical and textual editing 
tools. Apart from the editing tools, the main components of the Toolset are trans-
formation patterns, model-based animation, simulation and verification (see Fig-
ure 4). 
We have applied the Event-B modelling notation and its refinement methodol-
ogy to develop a theory of safe railway. This theory explicitly describes train 
movements, signal operation and point’s control. It does not, however, deal with 
any specific topology or control table. The proof of safety (we consider absence of 
collisions and derailments, and protection of flanks1) is done for some class of 
topologies and control tables. The proof of the Event-B model, although challeng-
ing, is done once and for all.  
An important by-product is the set of axiomatic conditions characterising the 
class of safe topologies and safe control tables. To establish that a given track 
topology and control table are safe we only need to check that they do not contra-
dict the mentioned axiomatic conditions. We do not need to redo the proofs of 
Event-B model. Safety verification is accomplished by putting together the defini-
tion of a concrete topology, control table and the axiomatic conditions derived by 
the Event-B model. If a constraint solver does not find a contradiction in logical 
statements encoded by this composition then the concrete topology and control 
table are deemed safe. Returning to the Event-B domain, the absence of contradic-
                                                            
1 Protection of the movement of a train across a junction that prevent any other unauthorised 
movement coming into contact with it. 
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tion established by a constraint solver means that our generic Event-B model of 
train behaviour is refined by a model instantiated with the given track topology 
and control table. 
 
 
Fig.4. The architecture of the SafeCap Toolset 
 
Schema topology and control table theories come in the form of a list of first 
order logic predicates; they do not define any state transitions or dynamic behav-
iour but rather well-formedness requirements to objects describing track topology 
and control table.  
For constraint solving, we make use of two sets of formal notations and tools: 
B together with ProB (Leuschel and Butler 2003) and Why3 (Bobot et al. 2011). 
In the short term, we aim to benefit from their complementary strengths; in a 
longer term, the dual verification path provides a logical redundancy that makes a 
low-level encoding or tool bug unlikely to be left undiscovered. 
4.1 Event-B 
We apply the Event-B formal modelling notation (Abrial 2010) to specify and 
verify railway signalling. Event-B belongs to a family of state-based modelling 
languages that represent a design as a combination of state (a vector of variables) 
and state transformations (computations updating variables). 
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An Event-B development starts with the creation of a very abstract specifica-
tion. A cornerstone of the Event-B method is the stepwise development that facili-
tates a gradual design of a system implementation through a number of correct-
ness-preserving refinement steps. The general form of an Event-B model (or ma-
chine) is shown in Figure 5. Such a model encapsulates a local state (program var-
iables) and provides operations on the state. The actions (called events) are charac-
terized by a list of local variables (parameters) vl, a state predicate g called event 
guard, and a next-state relation S called substitution or event action. 
 
Fig.5 Event-B machine structure 
 
Event parameters and guards may be omitted leading to syntactic short-cuts 
starting with keywords when and begin. 
Event g defines the condition when an event is enabled. Relation S is given as 
a generalised substitution statement (Abrial 1996) and is either deterministic (x 
:= 2) or non-deterministic update of model variables. The latter kind comes in 
two notations: selection of a value from a set, written as x :∈ {2, 3}; and a 
relational constraint on the next state v', e.g., x | x' ∈ {2, 3}. 
The invariant clause contains the properties of the system, expressed as 
state predicates, that must be preserved during system execution. These define the 
safe states of a system. In order for a model to be consistent, invariant preserva-
tion is formally demonstrated. Data types, constants and relevant axioms are de-
fined in a separate component called context. 
Model correctness is demonstrated by generating and discharging proof obliga-
tions - theorems in the first order logic. There are proof obligations for model con-
sistency and for a refinement link - the forward simulation relation - between the 
pair of abstract and concrete models. 
4.2 Discrete driving model 
The discrete driving model is an Event-B model capturing train, signal and point 
behaviour. It proves that the described behaviour is contained within a certain 
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safety envelope by formulating and proving, through a number of refinement 
steps, safety invariants corresponding to the first three verification objectives of 
Section 2. This model gives a formal definition of principal phenomena observed 
in railway operation: train movement, route reservation, point locking, route can-
cellation and so on. 
To construct the proof we have used Event-B (Abrial and Mussat 1998) and the 
Rodin Toolset (Rodin 2014). Train driving rules are encoded by Event-B events - 
atomic state transitions - so that the overall model defines a state transition sys-
tem. The safety properties are stated as a system invariant: a subset of possible 
states where the dangerous situations may not occur. The proof is done inductively 
by examining the effect of each event on a given safety property and discharging 
relevant proof obligation (first-order logic theorems).  
The model in Figure 6 illustrates the notation and modelling style of Event-B. 
This particular model is the very first (abstract) model in the development chain.  
The overall model is made of seven refinement steps with 470 verification con-
ditions of which 301 were discharged automatically by Rodin theorem provers. Its 
development span over several months and several early versions were abandoned 
either due to misrepresentation of some railway concepts or unacceptable verifica-
tion costs. 
Apart from its role in the validation of first two layers, the discrete operational 
rules of the third layer are used to visually animate train movements over a given 
schema. There are two main applications for such an animation: replaying the re-
sults of model checking of discrete driving rules in order to pin-point the source of 
an error in a topology or a control table; and helping an engineer to understand 
how trains may travel through a schema with a given set of control rules. 
4.3 Schema topology theory 
The schema topology theory is responsible for verifying logical conditions ex-
pressed over track layout (i.e., track connections, point placement) and logical 
topology (i.e., routes and lines as paths through a schema). Few examples of veri-
fication conditions include the connectivity property (no isolated pieces of track), 
continuity of routes and lines, absence of cycles, correct traversal of points and 
valid placement of train detection circuit boundaries.  
As a whole, these conditions express what we understand to be a valid track to-
pology. We have tested them against a number of large-scale real-life layouts and 
we able to discover some problem in already informally validated track topolo-
gies. In addition, semi-automated alteration and generation of track layouts (e.g., 
via the improvement patterns we are developing in the tool) necessitates a careful 
and strict inspection of these basic properties. An automated verification process 
ensures high productivity and enables an engineer to explore a large range of de-
signs within a short time.  
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Fig.6. An Event-B model of abstract, route-level train movement (an excerpt) 
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Figure 7 gives a sample of verification conditions written in the Classical B no-
tation (Abrial 1996) and ready to be processed by model checking tool ProB 
(Leuschel and Butler 2003). Not shown is the encoding of domain specific ele-
ments (track graph, control tables) as sets, relations and functions of a B model. 
For a real-life example, such a model may be 6-14 thousand lines long. The same 
conditions and constructs are also generated in the Why3 theory notation. It is not 
a direct translation of the B model and we intentionally use a different representa-
tion of relations and functions to introduce a form of modelling diversity. At the 
moment, for the topology theory, ProB and Why3 verifications chains deliver 
broadly similar performance. 
 
Fig.7. Schema well-formedness rules (an excerpt) 
4.4 Control table theory 
When the topology is verified we can define the conditions of operational safety. 
These are derived, via a formal proof, from a set of discrete (inertia-less) train 
movement rules and expressed as a set of constraints over signalling rules. 
In SafeCap, we depart from the convention of associating control rules with 
trackside signals. Instead, we consider a more general situation where different 
signalling rules are applied depending upon the ultimate train destination or train 
type and attach control logic to a pair of line and route. This permits, for instance, 
to model, on the same track, an express train using two-aspect signalling and a 
freight train travelling over the same routes but in a three or four aspect mode. 
Such an arrangement may be used to achieve an optimal balance between head-
way and average speed in a heterogeneous traffic mix. Given the fact that in UK 
trackside signals are going to be made obsolete by 2030 (TSLG 2012) this repre-
sents a fairly modest scenario of using virtual signals to improve capacity. 
The control table theory demonstrates such properties as the absence of poten-
tial collision (as may happen, for instance, when a proceed aspect is given while a 
protected part of track is still occupied) and derailment (due to incorrect point set-
ting or point movement under a train). Other properties relate to the danger or cir-
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cular dependencies between signals, dependencies between multi-aspect signals 
and operation of auto-signals, conformance with an Automatic Train Protection 
system, and verification of point and signal based flank protection. Certain proper-
ties, notably approach speed control via the timed occupation of a track section, 
are not verified at this stage, as the formalisation at this layer does not capture 
train inertia. Speed limit conformance and other time-related properties are formu-
lated at the final, most detailed layer. 
A list of sample control table theory conditions is given in Figure 8. For the 
shown rules, the outer quantification selects a pair of a line and a route that define 
a list of control rules (one per aspect). This model includes the topology model2. 
Constraint solving is the primary verification strategy: we try to detect a contra-
diction between concrete data structures defining topology and control tables and 
the verification conditions. Again, the model is given in both B and Why3 nota-
tions although this time the Why3 verification route is not successful for larger 
examples. This is due to the weakness in our axiomatization of the B mathemati-
cal notation in Why3. We are currently working on building a library of Why3 
lemmas to support translation from B to Why3 and this, we believe, should deliver 
a significantly better result. In addition, for any mid to large-scale schema we cur-
rently have to exclude the verification of flank protection properties, as these re-
quire complicated computations over track topology. We are working on a pro-
gram that would output a proof term for each instance of flank protection property 
so that a theorem prover or a constraint solver would only have to check the ele-
mentary steps of a prepared proof. 
 
 
Fig. 8. Control table conditions (an excerpt) 
5 Conclusions 
The SafeCap offers an efficient tool for signalling engineers to design railway 
nodes (stations and junctions) while automatically checking the conformity of the 
signalling and topology against a range of validation criteria expressing operation-
al safety and design integrity properties. Such level of automation enables rapid 
                                                            
2 At the level, it is assumed that the topology theory has been verified and the topology con-
straints are turned into axioms 
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exploration of signalling designs in the pursuit of optimal capacity and perfor-
mance stability.  
The work on the SafeCap Toolset is now taken further in our new project 
SafeCap for FuTRO supported by Rail Safety and Standards Board. In this work 
we are developing a support for an integrated reasoning about capacity and energy 
of railway networks and nodes while ensuring whole systems safety. 
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